Analysts' earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated analysts' conflict of interest and their incentives to adjust strategically forecasts to avoid earnings disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises, the market's response to surprises and forecast revisions, and in the predictability of non-negative surprises. Further confirmation is based on samples where conflicts of interest are higher (including growth stocks and stocks with consecutive non-negative surprises) or lower (such as foreign markets).
Equity research analysts make up a highly influential part of the investment industry. Investors pore over analysts' research reports and recommendations in order to obtain clues about the future prospects of a stock. Firm managers try to cultivate favorable coverage by analysts, so as to attract investor attention and boost their company's stock price. Brokerage firms heavily promote research by their analysts as a means of soliciting trading business from investors, as well as underwriting and merger advisory business from firms.
So much attention is devoted in the financial news outlets to the pronouncements of analysts that a handful of individuals, who command high profiles and high salaries to match, have attained the status of media celebrities. The influence of analysts is backed up by many academic studies (see, for example, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) , Womack (1996) , Barber et al. (2001) ) which find that changes in analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations contain information about future stock returns. Busse and Green (2002) , for instance, study television broadcasts of analyst opinions during part of 2000, and find that traders respond within seconds, considerably faster than the reaction time in earlier years.
The rise in analysts' fortunes is intimately intertwined with the boom in the equity market during the 1990s. Many firms, especially those in the technology, media and telecommunications sectors, took advantage of their lofty valuations during this period to raise capital. Analysts played a prominent role in drumming up demand for these stocks (Shiller (2000) ), with many analysts continuing to tout them well after the speculative excesses of the period became obvious. With the unravelling of the boom, however, the analyst community has come under fire. Numerous commentators chide the analyst community for "perpetuating a mania that fueled its own demise" (Santoli (2001) ). The central damning charge against analysts is that instead of providing impartial research they tend to be cheerleaders for the firms they cover. The abundance of buy recommendations and the paucity of sell recommendations, for instance, has frequently been cited as evidence of a lack of objectivity (Anderson and Schack (2002) ). As another example, forecasts of long-term growth in earnings consistently overshoot realized growth rates (Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002) ). Public skepticism about the quality of Wall Street equity research has led to calls for increased regulatory oversight of securities firms, including proposals to spin off the research divisions of brokerage firms.
Analysts may not always issue objective forecasts for a number of reasons. Their opinions may be 1 colored by personal career considerations. In the past, analysts were especially reliant on firm managers for information. As a result, they may have been reluctant to issue negative opinions that would antagonize firm management and jeopardize their access to managers. Even with recent regulations governing fair disclosure, this motivation may still be at work. Importantly, securities firms in general do not explicitly charge clients for research. Rather, analysts' research contribute to a security firm's revenues in other ways.
One lucrative source of revenue is from investment banking business. Accompanying the bull market of the 1990s was a spurt in investment banking activity, with companies raising capital and engaging in merger and acquisition deals. Analysts started to take an active role in securing underwriting business. An analyst may issue a bullish opinion about a stock in order to curry favor with executives who can direct future investment banking business to the brokerage firm. Another source of revenues is from trading commissions. In order to draw a larger clientele into buying a stock, an analyst may be predisposed to be more optimistic. In a nutshell, analysts are compensated for roles beyond providing accurate and timely research to investors.
This exposes them to potential conflicts of interest that may undermine their objectivity.
An alternative response to these allegations is that research analysts use the existing information available to come up with opinions that are, at least on average, unbiased. However, unanticipated events occur, or the research may have been based on faulty information, possibly deliberately supplied by managers to tone down expectations (or even to mislead the public). Thus, analysts' forecasts and recommendations can be wide off the mark through no fault of their own. With the benefit of hindsight, nonetheless, it is easy to find a convenient scapegoat in analysts' research. Biases in analyst forecasts might also be attributable to psychological factors that are unrelated to conflicts of interest. Humans are prone to a variety of cognitive biases that lead to systematic judgmental errors, such as the tendency to extrapolate past trends too far into the future. 1 There are several ways in which analysts can express their opinions about a stock. They forecast longterm growth rates and target price levels, and they issue buy or sell recommendations for a stock. By far the most intense and sustained attention in the media, however, is lavished on analyst estimates of earn-ings. Furthermore, investors in recent years appear to have placed increasing emphasis on a firm's earnings performance. Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002a) , Landsman and Maydew (2002) find that the absolute magnitude of abnormal returns, as well as abnormal volume, around earnings announcement dates have increased from the 1980s to the 1990s. Additionally, Francis et al. (2002b) report an increase over time in the market reaction to analyst forecast reports as well as earnings announcements. The popular perception in recent years is that an earnings disappointment represents extremely bad news. The stock price is sent plummeting, at least in the short term. Managers' compensation packages are dragged down if this occurs, and investor enthusiasm for the stock wanes.
Companies are hence under heavy pressures to ensure that earnings do not fall short of targets such as security analysts' forecasts. Managers exercise some discretion with respect to the timing, and magnitude, of various revenue and expense items. They can thus manipulate earnings through accruals, for example (see ). Another way to avoid disappointments is to manage forecasts. Management can guide analysts into toning down their forecasts, making it easier to match or surpass them. On their part analysts may lend a helping hand by shaving their projections as the earnings announcement date approaches. If investors do not see through such manipulation by managers and analysts, the stock price receives a boost. This paper examines whether analysts bias their opinions in favor of a company by adjusting their estimates in order to help managers match or exceed expectations. We focus on biases in earnings estimates for a number of reasons. First, in light of the heavy emphasis investors and the media devote to earnings results, the forecasted earnings number provides a natural vehicle for an analyst to paint a flattering picture of a firm's prospects. Numerous articles in the popular press provide anecdotal evidence that analysts engage in manipulation of their forecasts (see Fox(1997) , McGee (1997) , and Vickers (1997) ). From a researcher's standpoint, it is relatively easier to check for bias in earnings estimates, compared to the other outputs from analysts' research. Stock recommendations, as well as target price forecasts and estimates of long-term growth rates, extend over an unspecified horizon. As a result, it is hard to reconcile them with realized performance in order to detect biases. Estimates on the other hand are issued each quarter, so they can be confronted against realizations on a regular basis when earnings are announced.
We argue that recent U.S. market conditions have increased the predisposition of analysts toward positive surprises. We develop evidence in support of this argument along several lines. First, we document the distribution of earnings surprises at the announcement date with a large cross-section of firms, and track its evolution over an extended sample period. One way to deliver a pleasant surprise at the announcement date is for managers or analysts to adjust opportunistically the path of estimates within the quarterly reporting period. We also examine these within-quarter adjustments for traces of analyst bias.
Analysts' predisposition to positive surprises is likely to be especially pronounced in firms that enjoy favorable investor sentiment, such as stocks that trade at high relative valuation levels. Accordingly, we also provide results for the sample partitioned into growth and value subsets. Firms that have a track record of consistently exceeding expectations are especially sought after by investors. As another way of verifying that there are subsets of stocks where the pressure to manage surprises is particularly pronounced, we analyze the frequency of consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises (relative to the frequency expected by chance).
We round out our analysis with a regression model to predict the probability of a non-negative earnings surprise based on characteristics such as relative valuation levels, the time-path of within-quarter adjustments of estimates, and the sequence of past surprises.
To trace out more clearly firms' and analysts' evolving incentives to manage surprises, we also examine how the stock market responds to earnings surprises, and whether this response has heightened over time. We study returns immediately surrounding earnings announcements, and also over relatively longer horizons.
In addition, we consider investors' relative valuations of firms that consistently surpass expectations.
The incentives for firms and managers to manage earnings surprises is likely to be weaker in foreign equity markets. Compared to the U.S. and the U.K., conflicts of interest due to investment banking business are less severe in other markets. The overall level of initial public offering activity is lower and in general competition for investment banking business is less keen. The compensation for analysts also is generally lower. To throw into sharper relief our results on the U.S., we provide similar evidence on foreign markets.
Our general findings are as follows. Over the period 1984-2001, the cross-sectional distribution of earnings surprises in the U.S. undergoes a pronounced shift. In particular the proportion of non-negative surprises climbs over time from 48.88 percent in the late 1980s to 75.59 percent in 1999-2000. There is strong evidence that the increased incidence of non-negative surprises arises from strategic adjustments of 4 analyst forecasts over the reporting period. In cases where earnings fall short of the consensus three months before the announcement, analysts become more willing in recent years to revise downward their estimates by enough to yield a non-negative surprise upon announcement. These patterns are more pronounced for growth firms than for value firms. As well, there are more instances where firms meet or surpass expectations for several quarters in a row than can be attributed to chance. At the height of the bull market during the late 1990s, for example, growth firms who enjoy four consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises occur 35.4 percent more often than the expected frequency. The upshot is that the likelihood of a non-negative surprise becomes increasingly predictable over time, based on a firm's value-growth orientation, the sign of past surprises, and the sign of the most recent revision in the consensus estimate. In contrast to the U.S., foreign markets do not exhibit an increased disposition to positive earnings surprises.
Our analysis of the market reaction to earnings surprises buttresses these findings. Over our sample period the responsiveness of returns to surprises and forecast revisions grows, although the impact of surprises is dominant. As well, firms associated with a consistent history of at least matching expectations fetch markedly higher relative valuations. To a growing extent, therefore, managers and analysts have an incentive to manage earnings and forecasts so as not to disappoint investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I we develop our argument concerning how analysts' conflict of interest can give rise to biases in earnings estimates, and describe the sample and methodology. Section II describes the distribution of earnings surprises. Section III checks on the price impact of earnings surprises. We examine the degree of persistence in earnings surprises in section IV, as well as the valuation of firms who display persistence in earnings surprises. Section V develops probit models to predict the likelihood of a non-negative surprise. The international evidence is described in section VI. A final section concludes.
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I. Background
A. The predisposition to positive surprises
The existence of an optimism bias in analysts' forecasts is well-documented in many studies (Fried and Givoly (1982) , Klein (1990) ). Early in the reporting period, analysts' estimates on average tend to be biased upward, and they are adjusted downward over the period. By the time of the announcement date, the consensus estimate is generally aligned with actual earnings.
While this may have been the pattern in earlier years, recent market conditions may have worked to compromise analysts' impartiality, increasing their bias for at least some stocks. In particular, the lofty valuations produced by the strong bull market of the 1990s encouraged a surge in firms' equity issuance. Ritter and Welch (2002) report that the volume of initial public offerings (adjusted for inflation) approximately doubled from the 1980s to the 1990-94 period, doubled again from 1995-98, and doubled yet again (to $65 billion per year) from 1999 to 2000, ultimately declining in 2001 to $34 billion. The average underwriting fee for seasoned equity offerings also climbed in real terms from $2.7 million in the late 1980s to $5.3 million in the late 1990s (Mola and Loughran (2002) ). Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) survey corporate chief financial officers and find that firms place the highest priority on research coverage when selecting an underwriter.
Firms' eagerness for coverage, and security firms' thirst for lucrative investment banking business, suggest that the independence of research analysis may be traded off against the chance to win clients. An industry executive compares current market conditions with the past by noting that now "top analysts are truly neck and neck with top investment bankers, because the two now go hand in hand. The number of research analysts that had the capacity to bring in significant numbers of deals was very limited in the 1980's." 2 We thus posit that there is an upward trend over time in the tendency of analysts to generate positive earnings surprises. Earnings surprise is measured as the difference between actual earnings per share and the consensus estimate immediately prior to the announcement date (our methodology is spelled out in more 2 Morgenson (2001) . 6 detail in subsequent sections). Note that this point provides one basis for distinguishing between different explanations for analyst biases. Under the alternative hypothesis that forecasts are formed objectively and errors arise from unforeseen events, there should not be any trend over time in the distribution of earnings surprises. Similarly, human foibles in forecasting should not display trends over time.
However, an analyst's predisposition to help firm managers beat the estimate is not likely to apply equally to all firms. The accuracy of earnings forecasts still forms one basis of an analyst's compensation (see the evidence in Hong and Kubik (2002) ). An analyst may thus issue unbiased forecasts for many stocks.
The importance of not falling short of expectations, however, is especially high for growth stocks or stocks that have consistently done better than expected in terms of past earnings. In such cases there is likely to be a heavy dose of investor optimism about future prospects that is built into the stock price. Since the bar for future performance is set very high, a disappointing earnings announcement can be unduly harsh on the stock price (see La Porta et al. (1997) ). Managers, and analysts indirectly, will thus come under particularly intense pressure to ensure that earnings do not fall short of forecasts. Growth firms are also more frequently involved in capital-raising activity, so disappointing earnings may hinder their access to capital. To keep their current investment banking clients (and to attract future business), analysts have an incentive to avoid earnings disappointments. Lastly, growth stocks that capture investors' enthusiasm are likely to experience intensive trading activity. An analyst may not wish to imperil this source of trading commission income, and so may be more inclined to smooth the way for a positive surprise. Conversely, there is less reason to be a booster for firms that are out of favor with investors, such as stocks with poor past performance or value stocks. These are less likely to be heavily traded, and since they have not been growing they are unlikely to be potential investment banking clients.
In short, we argue that the probability of a positive surprise is ex ante predictable. Observable characteristics such as a firm's value-growth orientation and its past success in beating expectations are likely to be associated with the likelihood of a positive surprise. Such characteristics denote the extent of potential conflicts of interest which may compromise the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts.
There is some existing evidence in the finance literature on analyst biases due to conflicts of interest.
They center mostly on stock recommendations, however, and stop short of the late 1990s, when the conflicts 7 of interest were particularly acute. Michaely and Womack (1999) , for example, investigate analyst recommendations around initial public offerings. Dugar and Nathan (1995) also study earnings estimates but their sample period spans only six years and ends in 1988.
B. Data and methodology
We analyze the quarterly earnings forecasts for all domestic common equity issues covered on the IBES Daily Detail Earnings Estimate History File. Our sample period extends from the second quarter of 1984, when the number of available firms becomes sufficiently large, to the first quarter of 2001.
The consensus forecast of a firm's earnings that is commonly extracted from the IBES database is the mean over all analysts' estimates that are outstanding as of the middle of a month (the Thursday before the third Friday of the month). To safeguard against the possibility that any bias we uncover is a consequence of using a stale measure of expectations, we construct a customized consensus estimate that is more timely than a monthly consensus mean. Specifically, on each day prior to an announcement of quarterly earnings, we find the median of all valid estimates for a firm. A forecast by an individual analyst is considered to be valid unless it is placed by IBES on the stopped estimate file. As a further safeguard we require a firm to have at least five valid forecasts. After applying these criteria there are on average 1157 firms in the sample each quarter. 3 We use the median forecast to avoid giving too much weight to an individual prediction that may be relatively extreme. Using the median for the consensus also provides a simple intuitive interpretation of our results. In a case where realized earnings exceed the median, for example, we can be sure that at least half the analysts issued estimates that are below actual earnings. Such instances thus provide a direct validation of the hypothesis that each analyst has an incentive to generate a positive surprise.
In related research DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) highlight the importance of meeting psychological threshold levels for earnings. Zero net income represents one important perceptual baseline, for example, as does the consensus estimate. Similarly, coming in with a slight improvement, such as one or two cents per share over expected earnings, might represent a psychologically important focal point. Such discrete demarcations, however, are blurred if earnings are split-adjusted. Accordingly, we work with actual and forecasted earnings per share as they originally appeared. The IBES convention of reporting earnings on a split-adjusted basis introduces tricky issues, however. With the upward spiral in stock prices in the late 1990s, it is not uncommon to have cumulative split adjustment factors in excess of a hundred. The adjustment factor for Cisco Systems, for example, is 288 (as of mid-2001) . In this case a difference of one cent between actual and forecasted earnings as they were originally reported translates into a split-adjusted difference of roughly three-hundredths of a cent. This overflows the precision of the data reported on the IBES summary files, creating the impression that the earnings surprise is zero. The problem is particularly acute for successful, high-flying stocks, who also have stronger incentives to manage earnings and forecasts so as not to disappoint. We are in a unique position to address such issues, because we work with a customized data file from IBES that carries earnings and estimates as they were originally reported. Spot checks of our measures of actual and forecast earnings indicate that they generally agree with other sources, such as the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service and the IBES consensus estimate from the Summary file.
II. The distribution of earnings surprises
A. All firms Table 1 summarizes the frequency distribution of earnings surprises over all firms in the sample. The distribution is tabulated every quarter and the results are then averaged over quarters. We provide averages over the whole sample period (1984Q2 to 2001Q1) and for various sub-periods. In particular, the later subperiods generally coincide with the increase in market exuberance (and hence indirectly the potential for analyst conflicts of interest) over 1995Q1 to 1998Q4, its peak (1999Q1 to 2000Q1) , as well as its unravelling after 2000Q2.
In panel A, over the entire sample period the mean earnings surprise is -2.32 cents per share, so on average actual earnings fall short of the latest consensus forecast. There is an upward drift in the mean 9 surprise over time, however. In the earlier subperiods the mean surprise is -5.8 cents in the first subperiod (1984Q2-1989Q4) , enters positive territory in the 1995Q1-1998Q4 subperiod, and peaks at 1 cent in 1999Q1-2000Q1. This behavior is not driven by unexpectedly bad or good performance of a minority of firms: the upward drift over time is just as striking for the median surprise. This starts at -0.86 cents in the first subperiod, and also peaks at 1 cent in the 1999-2000 subperiod. The behavior of both the mean and median surprise thus indicates a rise over time in the tendency for analyst estimates to come in below actual earnings and generate a positive surprise.
The cross-sectional dispersion of surprises has declined as well. The standard deviation of the distribution diminishes from 37.76 percent in the first subperiod to 8.19 percent over 1999-2000, and stands at 10 percent in the last subperiod. 4 The quartiles of the distribution in panel A also confirm the downward trend in the dispersion of surprises. 5 The reduced variability in surprises is consistent with the argument that in recent years managers and analysts have engaged in a concerted effort to manage surprises. The frequency rises above fifty precent in 95Q1-98Q4, peaks at 59.48 percent and falls to 54.95 percent in the last sub-period. Recall that we record the consensus forecast one day before the announcement date.
Since the time-window between the consensus and the announcement is so short, it is unlikely that there is a systematic bias due to unexpectedly favorable overall economic conditions. Hence there is no reason to expect that the probability of a positive surprise should differ notably from the probability of a negative surprise, even if it were argued that business conditions were unexpectedly robust in the late 1990s. Instead, the trend in the distribution of surprises tracks the trend in market valuations, as well as the trend in the volume of underwriting and investment banking activity activity noted above.
There is a similar trend in the frequency of zero surprises. The percentage of cases where the surprise is zero increases from less than ten percent before 1994 to about 16 percent in the later part of the sample period. This may reflect improvements in forecast accuracy due to better dissemination of information over time, but it may also reflect an increase in the desire of managers and analysts to avoid disappointments.
Together, analysts and managers may be managing earnings and expectations in order to tame negative surprises. All in all, the incidence of negative surprises has tumbled from 51.13 percent in the first sub- The analysis so far has been concerned with the dollar magnitude of earnings surprises. Even when the surprise amounts to several cents, however, it may still be small relative to the level of earnings. Accordingly, we also report in the last two columns of panel B the frequency of cases where the surprise is small in either absolute dollar magnitude or in relative terms. Specifically, a small positive surprise denotes a firm-quarter where the earnings surprise is greater than zero and not more than one cent, or when the ratio of the surprise to the absolute value of the estimate is greater than zero and not more than five percent. Small negative surprises where actual earnings narrowly fall short of the consensus, are defined in a corresponding manner. The evidence in Table 1 suggests that managers and analysts have increased their efforts in recent years to avoid letting down investors' hopes with respect to earnings performance. In particular, the decrease over time in the dispersion of surprises reflects an increasing tendency to manage expectations. 6 Further, the rise in the incidence of positive surprises is consistent with managers' and analysts' increasing predisposition to put the best face on earnings performance and to steer clear of bad news about earnings.
B. Growth and value firms
The ballooning of valuations in the late 1990s was not uniform across different equity classes. For example the price-to-earnings multiple for growth stocks hovered around 1.5 times the price-earnings multiple for value stocks until the late 1990s. 7 From 1998 on, however, the ratio soared, so the valuation gap between 6 The dispersion may also be reduced if the overall level of earnings declined sharply over time. However, the magnitude of earnings per share is not markedly different across the sub-periods. For example, the cross-sectional average earnings per share in the first sub-period is 78 cents per share and 44 cents in the last sub-period. 7 These statistics are based on a comparison of the ratios of price to forecasted earnings between the Russell 1000 growth index and the Russell 1000 value index, as reported by Salomon Smith Barney.
growth and value firms widened dramatically in favor of growth firms, before peaking at about 3.5 times in early 2000. In particular, firms in the technology sector commanded very high valuations, accounting for roughly a third of the market value of the S&P 500 index. Similarly, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000) report a striking widening over the late 1990s in the dispersion of returns across equity classes segregated by size and book-to-market.
During the same period many growth firms, particularly those in the technology, media and telecommunications sectors, were intensively engaged in raising capital as well as merger activity. Firms and analysts would thus have been been especially anxious to paint a rosy picture of these firms' earnings prospects in order to maintain favorable investor sentiment. Further, given growth firms' steep valuations in the late 1990s, the penalties for earnings disappointments were potentially harsher for growth firms. These considerations suggest that the incentives to manage surprises are more acute for growth firms. To follow up on this line of thinking, Table 2 reports the distribution of surprises for value (panel A) and growth (panel B) firms.
Value firms are those whose book-to-market value of equity ratios exceed the median NYSE firm; growth firms have positive book-to-market ratios that place them in the bottom quartile based on NYSE firms. The breakpoints are chosen so as to obtain a roughly comparable number of firms in each group.
The two sets of firms share similar distributions of earnings surprises up to the mid-1990s. In the first sub-period, for example, the percentage of positive surprises is about 45 percent for value firms and 44 percent for growth firms. Thereafter, the distributions of the two groups diverge sharply. Growth firms enjoy an increasing tendency for positive surprises over the later sub-periods. To sum up, the tendency to tilt surprises toward zero and above is more pronounced for growth firms than for value firms. If analyst forecasts are unbiased, there is no reason to think that the distribution of surprises 13 should differ across different kinds of firms. On the other hand, the incentives to manage surprises have become sharper in recent years for growth firms. As a result, analysts' conflicts of interest are exacerbated, creating a bias in their forecasts for growth firms.
C. The distribution conditional on earnings forecast error
Under the hypothesis of forecast rationality a forecast made early in the quarter is as unbiased as a forecast later in the quarter. Put another way, the sign of the forecast error based on the estimate late in the quarter should resemble the sign of the forecast error based on the estimate early in the quarter. In particular if the original forecast error is negative one should expect to observe on average a negative surprise upon announcement. In recent years, however, as the tolerance for earnings disappointments has fallen, managers and analysts come under pressure to manipulate earnings or forecasts in order to forestall bad news. Suppose, for example, that as the announcement date approaches it becomes increasingly clear that actual earnings will under-perform the outstanding forecast. The desire to maintain a reputation as a good forecaster will prompt analysts to lower their estimates. With the added pressure in recent years to avoid earnings disappointments, managers and analysts also face an extra urgency to moderate expectations. Managers will hence try to guide down forecasts. Analysts may be motivated to lower their estimates by enough to eke out a non-negative surprise at the announcement date. The reverse situation -where it becomes clear that earnings will exceed original expectations -yields a less sharp prediction. Nonetheless, in such cases analysts will still try to ensure that when the actual numbers are released there are no unpleasant surprises.
In Table 3 we check on this hypothesis by splitting the sample into two sets of firms, based on whether the forecast error early in the quarter is at least zero or strictly negative. In panel A of each part of the table,
we calculate the error based on the consensus three months prior to the release of actual earnings. In panel B of each part of the table we replicate the experiment using the forecast error based on the consensus one month prior to the actual announcement.
Part I of Table 3 The results from Table 3 provide further confirmation of our hypothesis that analysts' incentives jeopardize their objectivity. In particular, during bullish markets analysts seem to adjust strategically their forecasts in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. These incentives are especially pronounced for firms with high valuations (growth firms), who are also more likely to be sources of investment banking business, compared to firms with relatively low valuations (value stocks). Of courese, it is not possible to identify unambiguously whether it is analysts or firm managers (or both parties) who engage in manipulating surprises. Managers may be responsible through the guidance they supply analysts or through their discretion over accounting methods. In any event, given the close ties between managers and analysts and the repeated process of providing earnings estimates every quarter, it is implausible that analysts persistently fail to see through any manipulation carried out by managers.
III. The price impact of earnings surprises
In this section we flesh out some of the forces behind the incentives for firms and analysts to manage surprises. We focus on two aspects of these market incentives.
The first issue concerns investors' response to earnings news. In particular, there is a widely held perception among market commentators that investors view a negative earnings surprise as a cause for alarm, and jettison stocks that miss expectations. If this is so, then the observed decline in the incidence of negative surprises during the exuberant period of the late 1990s suggests that the market was punishing more severely stocks that disappoint expectations. In this section we examine whether this is the case.
As noted above, one way to avoid an earnings disappointment is to adjust strategically the forecast.
However, such downward revisions generally trigger a negative stock price reaction. If analysts engage in these adjustments, the implication is that downward revisions in estimates in recent years are penalized less severely (at least in terms of the short-term price response), compared to missing expectations. In this section we also examine the differential penalties for estimate revisions and earnings disappointments.
We carry out our analysis by estimating each quarter cross-sectional regressions of the form
We analyze buy-and-hold returns r it for firm i in quarter t over two horizons: an announcement window starting three days before to one day after the announcement date of quarterly earnings, or a longer horizon starting three months before to the day after the announcement. The current quarter's surprise for the firm divided by the stock price on the day prior to announcement is denoted by S it . The forecast revision, ∆F it , denotes the difference between the most recent pre-announcement consensus estimate and the estimate three months before announcement, all scaled by the stock price on the pre-announcement day. The variable ∆F it captures all the revisions in the consensus forecast over the current quarter. For a large fraction of the sample the surprise is zero, thereby attenuating the estimated slope from the regressions. To get a sharper reading of the association between returns and surprises, therefore, we apply the regression to firms where actual earnings differ from the consensus by at least two cents. Table 4 reports the time-series averages of the regression slopes as well as the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns over the respective horizon. There is a striking increase over the sample period in the cross-sectional dispersion of returns during the announcement window (part I). It starts at 5.28 percent at the beginning of the sample period, grows to 12.31 percent over 1999-2000 and is 13.96 percent at the end of the period. The enhanced variability in announcement window returns is suggestive of the increasing importance that investors have attached in recent years to firms' earnings. Note that the market has become more sensitive even though our evidence indicates that earnings surprises are, to an increasing extent, manipulated by firms and analysts.
The average regression slopes for earnings surprises in the regression for five-day announcement window returns climbs steadily up to the late 1990s. In the first subperiod the average slope is 0.3382, while during the heyday of the stock market boom from 1999-2000 the average slope is 3.7907. While the regression slope increases over this period the economic impact may not go up correspondingly, because the crosssectional dispersion of surprises is smaller in the later subperiods (see Table 1 ). To get at the underlying economic penalties and benefits from surprises, we calculate the difference between the return when the fitted regression is evaluated at the 90-th percentiles of the regressors, and the return evaluated at the 10-th percentiles of the regressors. The predicted spreads confirm our finding that even though the dispersion of surprises has shrunk over time the overall impact has increased. In the 1999-2000 subperiod, for example, the regression yields a large difference in returns of 4.01 percent, compared to 0.72 and 2.17 percent in the first and second subperiods, respectively. These results help to explain the motivation that firms and analysts have in recent years to manage earnings surprises.
After taking into account the surprise, there is virtually no relation between announcement window returns and the revision from what the forecast was three months ago. The slope coefficients are small and not statistically significant, as are the predicted return spreads. Whatever impact the revisions have is already incorporated into the stock price prior to the announcement date.
To confront the importance of earnings surprises versus estimate revisions, we have to look at longer horizons. Accordingly, in part II of the table we examine returns over a period starting three months before and ending one day after the announcement date. To control for overall market movements we match each stock with a portfolio based on its rank by size and book-to-market ratio, and deduct the matched portfolio's buy-and-hold return from the stock's buy-and-hold return. 8 The regressions in part II of Table 4 are based on 8 The reference portfolios comprise all domestic common equities listed on the New York, American and Nasdaq markets with available data on the CRSP and Compustat files. At the end of June each year stocks are ranked by market value of common equity and placed in one of three groups: the largest 200, the next largest 800, and the remaining 2000. Within each size category, stocks are ranked by their book to market value of common equity from high (value) to low (growth) and split into two groups with roughly equal market capitalization. This yields six size-value control portfolios. The classification procedure follows Chan, Karceski and these excess returns. The incentive to adjust downward strategically analysts' forecasts should be stronger if the market's response, at least in the short term, to a revision is weaker than its response to a surprise (so (2)).
Both S and ∆F influence returns over a longer horizon. However, the coefficient on earnings surprise is generally larger than the coefficient on forecast revision. The average coefficient on earnings surprise over the whole sample period is 3.8635, while the coefficient for forecast revision is 3.2431. Both are reliably different from zero over the whole sample period. 9 During the peak from 1999-2000 both coefficients take
on larger values than the overall averages; however the coefficient on the surprise variable is still larger (7.0002 versus 5.8871 for the revision variable). To assess the full impact of surprises and revisions, we have to take into account the differences in the cross-sectional dispersions of the two variables. In this regard, the return spread associated with earnings surprises dominates the spread associated with forecast revisions. Over the entire sample period the spread is 6.80 percent for the earnings surprise variable, and 2.68 percent for forecast revisions. Although the spreads for both variables are higher during the peak from 1999-2000, the spread for earnings surprise is still larger than the spread for revisions (8.01 percent versus 3.60 percent).
The broad conclusion from the regressions is that there are potential payoffs, at least in the short run, to managing surprises. The stock price impact of surprises dominates the impact of forecast revisions. Lakonishok (2000) , and is meant to reflect the behavior of the widely-used Russell indexes. 9 Another interpretation of model (2) is as follows. The surprise as a percent of the pre-announcement price is S =
A−F LAST P LAST
where A is actual earnings, F LAST is the latest consensus estimate before the announcement, and P LAST is the price one day before the announcement. The estimate revision as a percent of the pre-announcement price is ∆F =
where F F IRST is the consensus three months before announcement. Manipulation of equation (2) yields
In this regard γ1 − γ2 measures the impact of the percentage earnings surprise on returns given the news about earnings as repre- These results also fit in with the rise in the management of surprises observed during the late 1990s, when valuations were particularly extravagant. An intriguing corollary to this is that the market apparently takes the surprise at face value, and does not see through the increasing tendency of firms and analysts to make strategic adjustments to actual earnings or estimates in order to paint a rosy picture of earnings results. 10
IV. The persistence of earnings surprises
Investors' attention is especially drawn to stocks that have a consistent record of meeting or exceeding expectations. The classic example of a stock that has delivered an unbroken string of positive surprises, and become highly sought after by investors, is Microsoft. In a related context, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002) document that stocks with a consistent history of high past growth in earnings are handsomely rewarded by investors. In this section we narrow our focus to firms that are associated with favorable surprises for several consecutive quarters. We argue that such cases represent instances where the management of surprises takes on an added importance.
If surprises are managed to an equal extent across all firms, the frequency of non-negative surprises will be high but there will be no excess persistence under our measure (the observed number and the expected number of consecutive non-negative surprises will be equal). Excess persistence arises if a subset of companies is more intensively engaged in managing surprises than the population at large. In these cases analysts and managers are attempting to avoid disappointments at almost any cost. Given the rich valuations commanded by many companies during the late 1990s, our conjecture is that during this period the incentive to avoid negative surprises is particularly acute, and hence the likelihood of excess persistence is higher. By the same token, persistence in the later subperiods should be exacerbated among growth firms compared to value firms, because the inflated valuations of many growth stocks probably left them most vulnerable to any surprises.
10 It could be argued that, irrespective of the relative magnitude of the market's response to revisions and surprises, managers and analysts pay more heed to what happens when actual earnings are reported. Individual analysts' updates of their estimates are spread out over the quarter, so the attention of investors and the media to revisions is diffuse. In contrast a company's announcement of earnings is likely to receive concerted media coverage, so the focus of investors and journalists is more intense.
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A. Continuations in earnings surprises
Our procedure for uncovering persistence in earnings surprises follows Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002) . At the end of each quarter we consider all stocks that survive over a given future horizon. We use horizons from one (the quarter that has just ended) to ten quarters. For each horizon we find the proportion of companies that have earnings surprises that are zero or higher in each quarter over the horizon. This proportion is compared to the proportion that would be expected if a non-negative surprise is random and occurs independently across quarters. For the expected proportion in a given quarter we use the empirical proportion of non-negative surprises realized each quarter in the sample period. That is, at the end of quarter q the expected proportion of firms with non-negative surprises over each of the next H quarters is given by
where p j is the proportion of firms that have non-negative surprises realized in quarter j. The calculations are repeated at each quarter-end, and the actual and expected proportions are averaged over all quarter-ends.
Panel A of Table 5 describes the results based on all firms. For the overall sample period, on average 59.3 percent of the firms experience a non-negative surprise in a given quarter. Since we calibrate the expected proportion from the realized sample proportions, the expected and realized proportions match for a horizon of one quarter. Firms that experience four consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises make up 25.8 percent of the sample on average. We should observe 14.9 percent of firms accomplish this solely by chance, so the observed incidence is 10.9 percent higher than expected. Firms that have a string of eight consecutive non-negative quarterly surprises constitute 12.5 percent of the sample, which is 9.5 percent more than expected by chance.
The excess persistence above the expected level generally rises over the subperiods. In the first subperiod, for example, the persistence at four quarters is 6.2 percent more than expected, and at eight quarters is 2.9 percent more than expected. As the relative valuations of growth and value stocks diverge more and more sharply over time, the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of consecutive nonnegative surprises also mount. In the late 1990s, the difference at four quarters is 17.3 percent and at eight quarters is 21.1 percent. The trend suggests that the management of surprises becomes more intense in a period of rising markets for at least some firms, including perhaps those who are most vulnerable to shifts in investor exuberance. 11
Panels B and C of Table 5 replicate the analysis for value and growth firms respectively. The definitions of these categories are as in Table 2 . In the case of value stocks, persistence over the expected level is meager.
Even at the market peak during the late 1990s, the difference between the actual and expected frequencies of four consecutive non-negative surprises is 2 percent. For these firms, at least, there is no differential incentive to manage surprises. On the other hand, the differences between actual and expected frequencies are large for growth firms, particularly in the late 1990s. Growth firms enjoy non-negative surprises for four quarters in a row by 35.4 percent more than expected. The corresponding differences during the first sub-period for growth firms are much lower. The percentage of growth firms who generate non-negative surprises for eight quarters consecutively during the late 1990s is especially striking (51.2 percent, or a margin of 42.5 percent above expected). This is a strong clue that for a substantial number of growth firms during the peak of the bull market, negative earnings surprises were viewed as intolerable, and the management of surprises was an overriding concern.
B. Persistence and valuations
This section investigates whether investors anticipate continuations in earnings surprises, and whether they reward companies that consistently meet or beat expectations. We do this by seeing whether firms that display consecutive surprises of the same sign are associated with different valuations either on an ex ante or an ex post basis. This analysis also underscores the motivations that firms and analysts have to manage surprises.
We take the ratio of book to market value of equity as our valuation measure. This variable is widely employed: for example, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002) use it to examine how the market responds to consistently high growth in earnings. It is also relatively well-behaved in that it sidesteps issues involving 11 We obtain qualitatively similar results if we look at firms with consecutive quarterly surprises that are strictly positive. For example, over the whole sample period the fraction of firms that beat the consensus estimate for four quarters in a row is 15 percent or 8.5 percent more than expected. In the 1999-2000 subperiod the corresponding fraction for four consecutive positive surprises is 28 percent, or 16 percent more than expected.
negative earnings or low base values of earnings that bedevil other indicators such as the price-to-earnings ratio. Specifically, at each calendar quarter-end we identify the stocks that experience runs of consecutive non-negative quarterly surprises (the run can be from one to ten quarters in length). We measure the median book-to-market ratios for each sample of stocks, both at the beginning of the run and at the end of the run. As a basis of comparison, we perform the same calculations for stocks that do not achieve consecutive runs of non-negative surprises. This procedure is repeated each quarter, and the statistics averaged over all quarter-ends are reported in Table 6 . Table 2 suggests that non-negative surprises are more prevalent for growth firms. This finding is reinforced in Table 6 . In any given quarter the firms that experience a non-negative surprise in that quarter have a beginning median book-to-market ratio of 0.45, compared to 0.52 for firms with a negative surprise. More generally, stocks that are associated with runs of consecutive non-negative surprises tend to have somewhat lower ex ante book-to-market ratios than firms that do not achieve runs. Over the entire sample period, for example, firms that have four consecutive non-negative surprises have a median book-to-market ratio of 0.40 at the beginning, compared to 0.48 for firms that do not enjoy runs of four consecutive non-negative surprises. A possible explanation for this is that the firms that subsequently have consecutive non-negative surprises already have a history of non-negative surprises.
The change in book-to-market ratios from the beginning to the end of the horizon indicate how market valuations respond to a run of successive non-negative surprises. Although a single quarter where the surprise is non-negative has no effect on the book-to-market ratio, valuations show a response after longer runs of surprises. Over a horizon of four quarters, for example, firms that enjoy a streak of consecutive non-negative surprises start with a median book-to-market ratio of 0.40 (or are valued at roughly 2.5 times book value) while the comparison sample has a median ratio of 0.48 (or trade at about 2 times book). At the beginning, then, the firms that subsequently enjoy a run of four quarters are trading at 1.2 times ( Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000) find that the stock market performance of value and growth stocks diverged widely during the late 1990s. There is related evidence on this in 
V. Predicting non-negative earnings surprises
We can formalize the degree to which there is persistence in quarterly surprises, as well as the contributing role of analyst behavior, as follows. In particular, we develop a probit model for the incidence of a nonnegative surprise, based on the sign of previous quarterly surprises individually as well as collectively, whether analysts have revised upward their estimates over the reporting period, and the stock's value-growth orientation. Define the variable y it such that it takes the value of one if firm i's earnings surprise in quarter t is non-negative, and zero otherwise. The full model is:
The explanatory variable S + t−j , j = 1, ..., 4 takes the value of one if the firm's earnings surprise in quarter t − j is non-negative and zero otherwise. Similarly RU N 4 t−1 takes the value of one if all four previous quarterly earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise; ∆F + t is one if the difference between the consensus estimate immediately prior to the current quarterly announcement date and the consensus one 24 month ago is non-negative, and otherwise the variable is zero. For stocks whose book-to-market value of equity as of the prior quarter is ranked above the median for NYSE firms, the variable V ALU E it−1 takes the value of one and is zero otherwise. The variable GROW T H it−1 equals one if the stock's book-to-market value of equity as of the prior quarter is positive and is below the 25-th percentile of NYSE stocks, and equals zero otherwise. We allow for persistence by including the sign of the four most recent past surprises.
In addition we hypothesize that a string of consecutive surprises of the same sign is an indication that managers and analysts are more prone to managing surprises, raising the likelihood that a negative surprise will be forestalled. The strategic adjustments of estimates over the current reporting period provides a further clue as to whether the surprise will be favorable. Analysts are less likely to raise their estimates if this would endanger the chances of a non-negative surprise. Finally, the high valuations of growth firms leave them more exposed to the penalties of a negative surprise, and they are also more likely to be current or potential investment banking clients. As a result, their incentives to manage surprises are larger, raising the ex ante probability of a non-negative surprise. The model is estimated at each calendar quarter-end. Table 7 reports statistics based on the time series of the estimated coefficients.
As a starting point, part I of Table 7 estimates the model using information only about past surprises and forecast revisions. Over the entire sample period the probability of a non-negative surprise is positively and reliably related to each of the explanatory variables. In particular, the occurrence of a run of consecutive non-negative surprises is strongly related to the likelihood of a subsequent non-negative surprise. The slope coefficient is 0.1276 with a t-statistic of 4.27. The slope coefficient for estimate revisions is also reliably positive, so prior adjustments in analyst estimates reliably predict non-negative surprises. The predictability in the incidence of non-negative surprises is consistent with the argument that managers and analysts manage surprises so as to avoid disappointments and give a favorable impression of the firm's earnings performance. To add weight to this argument, the predictive power of runs and estimate revisions is enhanced over the 1999-2000 subperiod. The coefficients of both variables are about 0.19, larger than the estimates over the overall period. As well, the chi-square statistic for the joint significance of the variables in the model is markedly higher during the late 1990s, indicating that a non-negative surprise became much more predictable in those years.
Part II of Table 7 extends the model beyond lagged surprises and forecast changes to include the firm's book-to-market orientation. In line with our results from the earlier tables, the likelihood of a non-negative surprise is sharply higher for growth firms than for value firms. This is particularly so at the height of market exuberance during the 1999-2000 subperiod. The average coefficient for the growth indicator in quation (5) is 0.2157 during this subperiod, compared to the value indicator's coefficient of -0.2294 (the t-statistics are 4.19 and -6.65 respectively). As another perspective on the difference between growth and value firms, we evaluate equation (5) using the estimated coefficients from part II of Table 7 . In the case of a value firm whose four previous surprises are negative and where the forecast revision is negative, the model yields an estimated probability that the next quarterly surprise is non-negative of about 32 percent for the overall period. For a growth firm whose four previous surprises are all non-negative and where the forecast revision is upward, the corresponding estimated probability is 81 percent for the overall period. The difference is particularly stark in the 1999-2000 subperiod when relative valuations were most out of line: for the same comparison the probability is 38 percent for value firms and as much as 93 percent for growth firms.
VI. International evidence
Compared to the U.S. market, the investment banking industry abroad is less developed, and the volume of restructuring, initial public offering and other underwriting activity has generally been lower. Further, the industry is less competitive. On their part analysts are much less visible and did not achieve the same celebrity status as their U.S. brethren. Accordingly, the potential conflicts of interest that undermine analyst research tend to be weaker in foreign markets. As a result, the experience of non-U.S. markets provides a valuable test case to check for analyst biases induced by conflicts of interest.
In particular, we hypothesize that there should be a less pronounced shift over time in the distribution of earnings surprises in foreign markets. To verify this hypothesis we examine the set of foreign stocks covered on the International IBES file. Quarterly earnings reports are in general not available for foreign companies, so we work with annual earnings announcements. For each firm, we construct a consensus estimate given by the median of all valid outstanding analyst forecasts (we continue to require that the stock must have at least 26 five outstanding forecasts). A further complication for the international sample is that in a large number of cases earnings are released with a substantial delay after the fiscal year-end. It is not uncommon, for example, for the release date to follow the end of the fiscal year by six months or more. By the time earnings are publicly announced at this late date, investors probably have a good idea of what actual earnings will turn out to be. Spot checks of the data, for example, yield numerous instances where the most recent forecast of nearly every analyst prior to the announcement date exactly matches actual earnings. The implicaton is that many individuals already have access to the information on actual earnings before the public announcement date. To circumvent this issue we take the consensus forecast one month before the announcement date, when there is potentially still some uncertainty as to actual earnings. 12 Table 8 provides results on the percentage of positive, negative and zero surprises for the overall period (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) as well as for subperiods. To ease comparisons with the U.S. evidence, we use annual subperiods that correspond as closely as possible to those in the earlier tables (although note that for the sake of statistical efficiency in Table 8 The other panels of Table 8 break out the international sample into subsets which resemble to a greater 12 We also replicate our analysis using the consensus two months before the announcement date, as well as the consensus immediately prior to the announcement date. The results do not indicate a pronounced tilt toward positive surprises in foreign markets in general, nor in the more recent subperiod.
or lesser extent market conditions in the U.S., so as to sort out more clearly the role of analyst conflicts of interest. Panel B reports the distribution of surprises for the major developed markets, as represented by countries in the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE (Europe, Australia and Far East) index.
Of the individual countries in the EAFE index, the Japanese market makes up the dominant component (in terms of the number of companies covered by IBES as well as market capitalization) over much of this period. However, the performance of the Japanese equity market during the 1990s was generally lackluster, and investment banking activity did not surge as in the U.S. As a result, there may have been less compelling pressures to manage earnings surprises. In line with this conjecture, the distribution of earnings surprises in Japan (panel C) does not show any signs of an increased predisposition to positive surprises over time.
On the other hand, the U.K. market, as well as many European markets, enjoyed a boom during the The U.K. sample (panel E) is particularly interesting because the U.K. and U.S. share many similar market features and institutional arrangements. In particular, the conflicts of interest prevalent in the U.S.
investment banking industry might also exist in the U.K. In the U.K. the proportion of positive surprises rises from 44.96 percent in the late 1980s to 59 percent in 1998-1999. There is hence some evidence supportive of the view that firms and analysts in the U.K., like their counterparts in the U.S., have become more prone to managing surprises.
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VII. Conclusion
As the boom in the equity market of the 1990s faltered, security analysts in the U.S. came under increasing fire for the quality of their research. The popular perception is that the incentives for analysts have shifted, so that instead of being impartial providers of unbiased opinions, they have become cheerleaders for the firms they cover. One hypothesis is that because research does not in general directly generate revenues for brokerage firms, analysts are susceptible to conflicts of interest that may lead to biases in analyst opinions.
Their impartiality may be compromised because they are also expected to secure underwriting and other investment banking business, so they have an incentive to paint a flattering picture of a company's earnings performance.
Analyst research may be tilted to favor a stock in several ways. Long-term growth rates in earnings or price targets may be overstated, the stock may receive a bullish buy recommendation, or an analyst may adjust forecasted earnings to ensure that actual earnings do not come up short of the estimate. Given the wide attention in the media to stocks' earnings performance, earnings forecasts provide a natural forum for examining analyst biases. Moreover, analysts explicitly specify the horizon over which their estimates apply and actual earnings are released four times a year, making the detection of any biases relatively more straightforward.
We check for biases induced by analyst conflicts of interest by tracking the behavior over time in quarterly earnings surprises (the difference between actual earnings and the consensus forecast of analysts). Our results indicate that the cross-sectional distribution of earnings surprises in the U.S. has undergone a pronounced shift. In particular, there is a rise in the proportion of non-negative earnings surprises over time, 
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Our evidence on analyst conflicts of interest is sharpened by narrowing the focus to two sets of firms:
growth firms, and firms that have experienced several consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises. Compared to value firms, growth firms are more likely to raise fresh capital and to carry out mergers or acquisitions. Analysts thus have stronger incentives to accomodate the interests of these potentially lucrative investment banking clients. We confirm that growth firms are more likely to be associated with non-negative surprises, compared to value firms. Firms that experience several consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises are particularly likely to be instances of surprise management by firm managers and analysts. We document that there are more cases of such runs of surprises than can be attributable to chance, and there is an upward trend in the frequency of runs. During 1999-2000, the number of stocks that are expected to have six consecutive non-negative surprises, to take an example, due solely to chance is 16.6 percent. The actual frequency of such cases is 38.2 percent, or more than twice the expected frequency. The results from a probit model confirm that the probability of a non-negative surprise can be reliably predicted from a firm's value-growth orientation, the sign of the most recent surprise, the occurrence of a run, and the direction of the most recent consensus revision. In particular the predictive power of the sign of the forecast revision suggests that managers and analysts are opportunistically adjusting earnings estimates in order to avoid disappointments.
To flesh out the underlying motives for managers and analysts to engage in such behavior, we also explore the market's response to earnings surprises, forecast revisions and to runs of surprises. We confirm that the response of returns to surprises has been heightened in recent years. The average estimated slope in a regression of announcement window returns on the earnings surprise is 3.7907 in 1999-2000, compared to 0.3382 in 1984-1989 . Since the impact of an announcement surprise dominates the impact of a previous forecast revision, there is room for managers and analysts to engage in strategic manipulation of estimates over a quarter. Moreover, investors handsomely reward stocks that achieve runs of non-negative surprises.
Stocks that enjoy eight consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises see their valuations (price-to-book 30 ratio relative to stocks not subject to this experience) rise from 1.2 times at the outset to 1.7 times at the end.
The overall conclusion is that the incentives to manipulate actual and forecasted earnings so as to steer clear of disappointments have been exacerbated in recent years.
A final, persuasive piece of evidence comes from outside the U.S. market. The links between investment banking and analyst research are in general weaker in foreign markets, so they provide a natural test case.
For the sample of foreign markets as a whole, the distribution of earnings surprises does not display an increasing disposition to positive surprises, unlike the U.S. data. On the other hand, the U.K. enjoyed a booming equity market in the late 1990s, especially for the technology and telecommunication sectors, and offers close parallels to the U.S. in terms of investment banking activity and the media attention given to Table 2 Frequency distribution and summary statistics of earnings surprise, classified by value or growth At the beginning of each calendar quarter, all firms with data on book and market value of equity are ranked and sorted by the ratio of book-to-market value of equity. Firms with positive book-to-market ratios and ranked in the top 50 percent based on NYSE breakpoints are classified as value firms; firms with positive book-to-market ratios and ranked in the bottom 25 percent are classified as growth firms. Within each classification, the earnings surprise for a firm in a quarter is the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the most recent consensus forecast prior to the announcement date. Earnings surprises are measured in cents per share (based on number of shares outstanding as of the earnings announcement date), and are computed for all firms with data on the historical IBES file with forecasts from at least five analysts. Numbers reported in the table are  averages over Table 3 Frequency distribution and mean of earnings surprise, classified by forecast errors relative to consensus estimate one and three months prior to announcement Each calendar quarter, the earnings forecast error (actual quarterly earnings per share minus the consensus estimate) is calculated for all firms with data on the historical IBES file with forecasts from at least five analysts. Part I of the table reports results for all firms. In panel A, the earnings forecast error is based on the consensus estimate three months prior to the earnings announcement date; in panel B the earnings forecast error is based on the consensus estimate one month before the announcement date. Firms are classified into two groups: those with forecast errors greater than zero, and those with strictly negative errors. Within each classification, earnings surprise for a firm in that quarter is the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the consensus forecast the day before the announcement date. Earnings surprises are measured in cents per share (based on the number of shares outstanding as of the announcement date). In part II of the table, firms are ranked by the ratio of book to market value of equity and classified into two groups. Firms with positive book-to-market ratios and ranked in the top 50 percent based on NYSE breakpoints are classified as value firms; firms with positive book-to-market ratios and ranked in the bottom 25 percent are classified as growth firms. Numbers reported in the table are averages over sub-periods and the whole period from 1984Q2 to 2001Q1. Table 4 Sensitivity of returns to earnings surprise Each calendar quarter, the following cross-sectional regressions are estimated:
Part I. All firms
Buy and hold returns r it for each firm i in quarter t are from three days before to one day after the announcement of quarterly earnings (part I of the table), or from three months before to one day after the announcement of quarterly earnings (part II of the table). Returns are in excess of the return on a control portfolio of stocks matched by size and book-to-market. The earnings surprise, S it , is the actual quarterly earnings per share minus the most recent consensus estimate prior to the announcement date, scaled by the stock price the day before the announcement date; the estimate revision ∆F is the difference between the most recent consensus estimate prior to the announcement date and the consensus three months ago, scaled by the stock price the day before the announcement date. The regressions are based on all firms with data on the historical IBES file with forecasts from at least five analysts, and where actual and consensus forecast earnings differ by at least two cents in absolute value. In each quarter, the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the distribution of S or ∆F is multiplied by the corresponding slope estimate to give the predicted return spread. The cross-sectional standard deviation of excess returns over the respective horizons is also reported. Numbers reported in the Table 5 Persistence in earnings surprise In each calendar quarter over the period 1984Q2 to 2001Q1 the sample comprises all domestic stocks with available data on the IBES historical file and with coverage by at least five analysts. For each firm, its earnings surprise, the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the most recent consensus forecast prior to the announcement date, is calculated in each of the following one to ten quarters (or until delisting). The number of firms with non-negative earnings surprises in every quarter for the indicated number of quarters (from one to ten) is reported as a percentage of the number of firms in the original sample. The expected fraction is based on the actual frequency of non-negative earnings surprises over all firms realized in each of the following one to ten quarters and assuming independence over time. The reported numbers are averages over subperiods and over all quarters. In panel A of the table, all firms are eligible for inclusion in the sample. In panels B and C of the table, firms are ranked by the ratio of book to market value of equity as of the prior quarter and classifed either as value stocks (with positive book-to-market ratios and ranked in the top 50 percent based on NYSE breakpoints), or growth stocks (with positive book-to-market ratios and ranked in the bottom 25 percent). Table 6 Book-to-market ratios at beginning and end of horizon for firms with consecutive non-negative earnings surprises At every calendar quarter-end over the sample period, the earnings surprise (the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the most recent consensus forecast prior to the announcement date) is calculated for each stock in the current quarter and over each of the subsequent nine quarters (or until delisting). Ten sets of stocks are formed, where each set comprises firms that have non-negative earnings surprises in every quarter over the indicated horizon of consecutive quarters (from one to ten). The median ratio of book-to-market value of equity is measured at the beginning of the horizon and also at the end of the horizon for each set. The reported number is the median ratio averaged over all quarter-ends for these stocks (panel A). The same procedure is applied to all stocks that do not have consecutive non-negative surprises over the indicated horizon (panel B). The sample period is 1984Q2-2001Q1, and the sample includes all domestic firms listed on the New York, American and Nasdaq markets with data on the IBES historical file with coverage by at least five analysts.
Number of consecutive non-negative quarterly surprises Table 7 Probit estimates for predicting non-negative earnings surprises
The full model is y it = γ 0 + γ 1 S + it−1 + γ 2 S + it−2 + γ 3 S + it−3 + γ 4 S it−4 + + γ 5 RU N 4 it−1 + γ 6 ∆F + it + γ 7 V ALU E it−1 + γ 8 GROW T H it−1 + it . The variable y it takes the value of one if firm i's earnings surprise in quarter t is non-negative and zero otherwise. The earnings surprise is the actual quarterly earnings per share minus the most recent consensus estimate prior to the announcement date. S + it−j for j = 1,...,4, takes the value of one if the stock's earnings surprise in quarter t − j is non-negative and zero otherwise. RU N 4 it−1 is set to one if the stock's earnings surprise in every one of the previous four quarters is non-negative, and is zero otherwise. ∆F + t equals one if the difference between the consensus estimate immediately prior to the announcement date and the consensus estimate one month ago for the stock is non-negative and equals zero otherwise. V ALU E it takes the value of one if stock i is a value stock (with last quarter's book-to-market value of equity ranked above the 50-th percentile of NYSE stocks) and zero otherwise; GROW T H it takes the value of one if the stock is a growth stock (with last quarter's book-to-market value of equity positive and ranked below the 25-th percentile of NYSE stocks) and zero otherwise. The model is estimated each calendar quarter, and statistics are calculated for the time series of coefficient estimates. Numbers reported in the table are estimated coefficients (with t-statistics in parentheses), the chi-square statistic χ 2 for the joint significance of the slope coefficients (with its corresponding p-value in statistics), all averaged over subperiods and over all quarters from 1984Q2 to 2001Q1. Table 8 Frequency distribution and summary statistics of earnings surprise, international sample Earnings surprise S for each firm in each quarter is the difference between actual quarterly earnings per share and the consensus forecast one month prior to the announcement date. Earnings surprises are based on number of shares outstanding as of the earnings announcement date, and are computed for all firms with data on the historical International IBES file with forecasts from at least five analysts. The median is also reported for the earnings surprise relative to the absolute value of forecast earnings. Numbers reported in the table are 
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